orces were to be driven as persistently as possible back
from the fertile southern states into the narrower tract on the north.

But above all the plan of war was based on the resolve to attack the
enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces so compact
that a superior force could always be brought into the field. By
whatever special means these plans were to be accomplished was left to
the decision of the hour; the advance to the frontiers alone was
preordained in every detail.

It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a
prolonged period and carried out in every point. The first collision
with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the
result. Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which
originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of
an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide
for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose
unflinchingly.

The departure of the French troops to the frontier, before they were
thoroughly prepared for service in the field, which is a very serious
step to take, was evidently ordered for the purpose of surprising the
German army, with the forces immediately at command, and thus
interfering with the formation of their advance. But, in spite of
this, the German commanders did not deviate from their purpose of
massing their armies on the Rhine and crossing that river. The railway
transport of the troops of the IId and IIId Corps, however, was to end
at the Rhine; thence they were to march on foot into the cantonments
prepared on the left bank of the river. They moved in echelon,
advancing only so many at a time as would make room for the Division
behind them, as far as the line marked by the towns of Bingen,
Duerkheim, and Landau.

The final advance towards the frontier was not to be undertaken until
the Divisions and Corps were all collected, and provided with the
all-necessary baggage train; and then proceed in a state of readiness
to confront the enemy at any moment.

The assembling of the First Army appeared to be less threatened, as
its route lay through neutral territory, and was protected by the
garrisons of Treves, Saarlouis, and Saarbruecken, the German outposts
on the Saar.

The First Army, 50,000 strong, was concentrated at Wadern, in the
first days of August. The Second Army, which meanwhile had been
increased to a strength of 194,000 men, had pu