ith the legislatures of the States, Congress cannot
constitutionally pass ex post facto laws in criminal cases, nor suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, nor pass a bill of attainder, nor abridge the
freedom of speech and of the press, nor invade the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, nor enact
laws respecting an establishment of religion. These are general
limitations. Congress cannot do these things _any where_. The exact
import, therefore, of the clause "in all cases whatsoever," is, _on all
subjects within the appropriate sphere of legislation_. Some
legislatures are restrained by constitutions, from the exercise of
powers strictly within the proper sphere of legislation. Congressional
power over the District has no such restraint. It traverses the whole
field of legitimate legislation. All the power which any legislature has
within its own jurisdiction, Congress holds over the District of
Columbia.

It has been objected that the clause in question respects merely police
regulations, and that its sole design was to enable Congress to protect
itself against popular tumults. But if the convention that framed the
Constitution aimed to provide for a _single_ case only, why did they
provide for "_all_ cases whatsoever?" Besides, this clause was opposed
in many of the state conventions, because the grant of power was not
restricted to police regulations _alone_. In the Virginia Convention,
George Mason, the father of the Virginia Constitution, Patrick Henry,
Mr. Grayson, and others, assailed it on that ground. Mr. Mason said,
"This clause gives an unlimited authority in every possible case within
the District. He would willingly give them exclusive power as far as
respected the police and good government of the place, but he would give
them no more." Mr. Grayson said, that control over the _police_ was
all-sufficient, and "that the Continental Congress never had an idea of
exclusive legislation in all cases." Patrick Henry said, "Is it
consistent with any principle of prudence or good policy, to grant
_unlimited, unbounded authority?_" Mr. Madison said in reply: "I did
conceive that the clause under consideration was one of those parts
which would speak its own praise. When any power is given, its
delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it....
The powers which are found necessary to be given, are therefore
delegated _generally_, and particular and minute