es contradict common experience, and the reports of
history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with
one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are
required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the
different evidence and probability of the thing: which rises and
falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. COMMON
OBSERVATION IN LIKE CASES, and PARTICULAR TESTIMONIES IN THAT PARTICULAR
INSTANCE, favour or contradict it. These are liable to so great
variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different
qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c., of the reporters,
that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees
wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, That
as the arguments and proofs PRO and CON, upon due examination, nicely
weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon
the whole matter, in a greater or less degree to preponderate on
either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different
entertainments, as we call BELIEF, CONJECTURE, GUESS, DOUBT, WAVERING,
DISTRUST, DISBELIEF, &c.

10. Traditional Testimonies, the further removed the less their Proof
becomes.

This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use
of: concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a
rule observed in the law of England; which is, That though the attested
copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy, ever so well
attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a
proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable,
and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after
material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it.
This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong,
carries this observation along with it, viz. THAT ANY TESTIMONY, THE
FURTHER OFF IT IS FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUTH, THE LESS FORCE AND PROOF IT
HAS. The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the
original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good
proof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report,
the testimony is weaker: and a third that attests the hearsay of an
hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each
remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition
has su