n which forbids inquiry into paternity as an unnatural
measure, or as a monstrosity of civil law.

Two human beings who procreate others contract common duties and
responsibility of the highest importance. They are, perhaps, the
highest social duties that man can assume. Is it not then infamous and
unnatural to legally liberate one only of the procreators, the man,
from all his responsibilities, simply because certain religious or
civil formalities were omitted before procreation?

Is the man less guilty than the woman in procreation apart from
marriage, if we can use the term guilt in such cases? Is it not a
ridiculous and cruel irony to call _natural children_ those born apart
from marriage? Perhaps legitimate children are supernatural, or
unnatural! Is it not infamous to brand with the seal of shame, even
before their birth, poor illegitimate children, and to confirm this
indignity by making them bear their mother's name instead of their
father's?

The most elementary natural law exacts that all children, whether
"legitimate" or "illegitimate," should have the same social rights,
and that they should bear either the name of their real father or that
of their mother; the latter denomination would be the more natural and
logical. Denomination by the maternal line corresponds to the system
of matriarchism (Chapters VI and XIX), which is often met with among
savage races, and which is more just and leads to less abuse than
patriarchism. Moreover, when women shall have obtained their proper
rights, there will be an end of the exclusive authority of one of the
conjoints in marriage.

Equality in the rights of the two sexes will naturally lead to
denomination in the maternal line, for reasons of simplicity, the
mother being more closely related to the child than the father.
Maternity may, no doubt, be sometimes uncertain, as in the case of
foundlings or changelings, but on the whole it is infinitely more easy
to establish than paternity. It is sufficient for the mother to have
sexual connection with two men at the time of conception to render
paternity doubtful. Again, the mother has a number of pains, cares and
dangers to undergo in the course of the procreation and education of
children, which the father escapes. Nature thus gives the mother the
right to give her name to the family. Our legislation is unfortunately
far from recognizing such natural right. We may nevertheless form a
primary proposition, because in my