to which perhaps
history has furnished no parallel. There never arose, during the whole
time, an instance of an unpleasant thought or word between the members.
We sometimes met under differences of opinion, but scarcely ever failed,
by conversing and reasoning, so to modify each other's ideas, as to
produce an unanimous result. Yet, able and amiable as these members
were, I am not certain this would have been the case, had each possessed
equal and independent powers. Ill defined limits of their respective
departments, jealousies, trifling at first, but nourished and
strengthened by repetition of occasions, intrigues without doors of
designing persons to build an importance to themselves on the divisions
of others, might, from small beginnings, have produced persevering
oppositions. But the power of decision in the President left no object
for internal dissension, and external intrigue was stifled in embryo by
the knowledge which incendiaries possessed, that no divisions they
could foment would change the course of the executive power. I am not
conscious that my participations in executive authority have produced
any bias in favor of the single executive; because the parts I have
acted have been in the subordinate, as well as superior stations, and
because, if I know myself, what I have felt, and what I have wished, I
know that I have never been so well pleased, as when I could shift power
from my own, on the shoulders of others; nor have I ever been able to
conceive how any rational being could propose happiness to himself from
the exercise of power over others.

I am still, however, sensible of the solidity of your principle, that,
to insure the safety of the public liberty, its depository should be
subject to be changed with the greatest ease possible, and without
suspending or disturbing for a moment the movements of the machine of
government. You apprehend that a single executive, with, eminence of
talent, and destitution of principle, equal to the object, might, by
usurpation, render his powers hereditary. Yet I think history furnishes
as many examples of a single usurper arising out of a government by a
plurality, as of temporary trusts of power in a single hand rendered
permanent by usurpation. I do not believe, therefore, that this danger
is lessened in the hands of a plural executive. Perhaps it is greatly
increased, by the state of inefficiency to which they are liable from
feuds and divisions among themselves