re were a bank. But if
there be no balance of commerce, either direct or circuitous, all the
banks in the world could not bring us the surplus of taxes but in the
form of money. Treasury orders, then, and bills of exchange, may prevent
the displacement of the main mass of the money collected, without the
aid of any bank: and where these fail, it cannot be prevented even with
that aid.

Perhaps, indeed, bank bills may be a more convenient vehicle than
treasury orders. But a little difference in the degree of convenience,
cannot constitute the necessity which the constitution makes the ground
for assuming any non-enumerated power.

Besides; the existing banks will, without doubt, enter into arrangements
for lending their agency, and the more favorable, as there will be a
competition among them for it. Whereas, this bill delivers us up bound
to the national bank, who are free to refuse all arrangements but on
their own terms, and the public not free, on such refusal to employ any
other bank. That of Philadelphia, I believe, now does this business by
their post notes, which, by an arrangement with the treasury, are paid
by any State collector to whom they are presented. This expedient alone,
suffices to prevent the existence of that necessity which may justify
the assumption of a non-enumerated power, as a means for carrying into
effect an enumerated one. The thing may be done, and has been done, and
well done, without this assumption; therefore, it does not stand on that
degree of necessity which can honestly justify it.

It may be said, that a bank, whose bills would have a currency all over
the States, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited
to a single State. So it would be still more convenient, that there
should be a bank whose bills should have a currency all over the world.
But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that there exists
any where a power to establish such a bank, or that the world may not
go on very well without it. Can it be thought that the constitution
intended, that for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress
should be authorized to break down the most ancient and fundamental
laws of the several States, such as those against mortmain, the laws of
alienage, the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws
of escheat and forfeiture, and the laws of monopoly. Nothing but a
necessity invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostration
o