points, and Congress determined to
take a hand in the matter.

No well-informed person supposed for a moment that the regulation of
child labor was one of the functions of the General Government as those
functions were planned by the makers of the Constitution. The United
States Supreme Court had declared over and over again that such matters
were the province of the states; that "speaking generally, the police
power is reserved to the states and there is no grant thereof to
Congress in the Constitution."[1] For some years, however, Congress had
been finding ways to legislate indirectly upon matters which it had no
power to approach directly. Under the grant of power in the Constitution
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States,"[2] Congress had enacted laws purporting to regulate commerce
but in reality designed for the suppression or regulation of some other
form of activity. These enactments had for the most part been sustained
as constitutional by the Supreme Court (though with misgivings and sharp
differences of opinion), the Court holding that it could not pass on the
motives for congressional action. The enactment of a law regulating
child labor seemed therefore but another step along a trail already
blazed, and Congress determined to take that step.

[Footnote 1: _Keller v. United States_, 213 U.S., 138.]

[Footnote 2: Art. I, Sec. 8.]

The statute enacted by Congress[1] prohibited transportation in
interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in which, within thirty
days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of
fourteen years had been employed or permitted to work, or children
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen had been employed or permitted
to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any
week, or after the hour of 7 P.M. or before the hour of 6 A.M. The
constitutionality of the act was at once challenged and suit brought to
test the question. The Supreme Court held, by a vote of five to
four,[2] that Congress had overstepped its power. The previous decisions
which had upheld somewhat similar inroads on the police power of the
states were distinguished and the act was declared unconstitutional.

[Footnote 1: Act of September 1, 1916, 39 Stat., 675.]

[Footnote 2: _Hammer v. Dagenhart_, 247 U.S., 251.]

The distinction drawn by the majority of the Court between this and
previous decisions was a narrow one and its validity has