es; "but, if it is agreeable to you, let
us return to the point from whence we digressed."

"It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?"

"You say well," rejoined Cebes.

"We ought, then," said Socrates, "to ask ourselves some such question
as this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus
affected--namely, to be dispersed--and for what we ought to fear, lest
it should be so affected, and for what not. And after this we should
consider which of the two the soul is, and in the result should either
be confident or fearful for our soul."

"You speak truly," said he.

62. "Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by
composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be
dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if
there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone,
if to any thing, not to be thus affected?"

"It appears to me to be so," said Cebes.

"Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same,
and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are
constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?"

"To me it appears so."

"Let us return, then," he said, "to the subjects on which we before
discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account
that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or
does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself,
and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?
Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself,
continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any
variation at all under any circumstances?"

"They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state,
Socrates," said Cebes.

63. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men,
horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or
beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the
same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so
to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?"

"These, on the other hand," replied Cebes, "never continue the same."

"These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses;
but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way
than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are
not seen?"