be little chance for a
miscarriage of justice. Even should there be, it would result in the
speedy release of one against whom the public bore no ill-will. One who
was sick or insane would ordinarily not need a lawyer, as the state
would bear him no malice and make no effort to do more than investigate
the case and present the facts. The whole matter should be a purely
scientific attempt to find out the best thing to be done both for the
interest of the public and the interest of the man.

No doubt, in many cases, men are convicted who are perfectly innocent of
the crime of which they are accused. This is especially true with the
poor who can provide for no adequate defense and who perhaps have been
convicted before of some misdemeanor or crime. This is also often true
in cases where there is great prejudice against the defendant, either on
account of the nature of the case or of the defendant on trial. For
instance, during the recent war a wave of hysteria swept over the world,
and courts and juries trampled on individual rights and freely violated
the spirit of laws and constitutions. The close of the war left the same
intense feelings of bitterness which made justice impossible in cases
where the charge savored of treason, and involved criticism of the
government, or advocacy of a change of political systems.

Questions of race, religion, politics, labor and the like have always
awakened violent feelings on all sides, have made bitter partisans and
strict lines of cleavage, and have made verdicts of juries and
judgments of courts the result of fear and hatred. In spite of this,
most of the inmates of prisons have done the acts charged in the
indictments. Why they did them, their states of mind, the conditions and
circumstances surrounding them, what can be done to make them stronger
and better able to meet life are never ascertained, and few courts or
juries have ever deemed these things proper subjects for consideration
or in any way involved in the case.

In law every crime consists of two things: an act and an intent. Both
are necessary to constitute legal guilt, and on the prevalent theory of
moral guilt and punishment both are necessary to make up criminal
conduct. There can be no legal or moral guilt unless one intends
wickedness; unless he deliberately does the act because he wishes to do
wrong and knows he does wrong. The question then of moral guilt, which
is necessary to the commission of a criminal act,