ion of the opinion to the Chief-Justice; and when advised of
the change I simply gave notice that I should read the opinion I had
prepared as my own, and which is the one on file." From this time the
pens of other judges were busy, and in the inner political circles of
Washington the case of Dred Scott gradually became a shadowy and
portentous _cause celebre_.
The first intimation which the public at large had of the coming new
dictum was given in Mr. Buchanan's inaugural. The fact that he did
not contemplate such an announcement until after his arrival in
Washington[5] leads to the inference that it was prompted from high
quarters. In Congressional and popular discussions the question of the
moment was at what period in the growth of a Territory its voters
might exclude or establish slavery. Referring to this Mr. Buchanan
said: "It is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the
Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, and
will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their
decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit,
whatever this may be."
The popular acquiescence being thus invoked by the Presidential voice
and example, the court announced its decision two days afterwards--March
6, 1857. The essential character of the transaction impressed itself
upon the very form of the judgment, if indeed it may be called at all
by that name. Chief-Justice Taney read the opinion of the court.
Justices Nelson, Wayne, Daniel, Grier, Catron, and Campbell each read a
separate and individual opinion, agreeing with the Chief-Justice on
some points, and omitting or disagreeing on others, or arriving at the
same result by different reasoning, and in the same manner differing
one from another. The two remaining associate justices, McLean and
Curtis, read emphatic dissenting opinions. Thus the collective
utterance of the bench resembled the speeches of a town meeting rather
than the decision of a court, and employed 240 printed pages of learned
legal disquisition to order the simple dismissal of a suit. The opinion
read by Chief-Justice Taney was long and elaborate, and the following
were among its leading conclusions:
That the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States do not include nor refer to negroes otherwise than as
property; that they cannot become citizens of the United States nor
sue in the Federal courts. That Dred Scott's
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