ul God! hast thou not
revealed to us the being of a conscience, and of reason, and of
will;--and does this Barrister tell us, that he "understands" them? Let
him know that he does not even understand the very word understanding.
He does not seem to be aware of the school-boy distinction between the
[Greek: hoti esti] and the [Greek: dioti]? But to all these silly
objections religion must for ever remain exposed as long as the word
Revelation is applied to any thing that can be 'bona fide' given to the
mind 'ab extra', through the senses of eye, ear, or touch. No! all
revelation is and must be 'ab intra'; the external 'phaenomena' can only
awake, recall evidence, but never reveal. This is capable of strict
demonstration.

Afterwards the Barrister quotes from Thomas Watson respecting things
above comprehension in the study of nature: "in these cases, the 'fact'
is evident, the cause lies in obscurity, deeply removed from all the
knowledge and penetration of man." Then what can we believe respecting
these causes? And if we can believe nothing respecting them, what
becomes of them as arguments in support of the proposition that we
ought, in religion, to believe what we cannot understand?

Are there not facts in religion, the causes and constitution of which
are mysteries?

[Footnote 1: Hints to the Public and the Legislature on the nature and
effect of Evangelical Preaching. By a Barrister. Fourth Edition, 1808.]

[Footnote 2: See Aids to Reflection, p. 14, 4th edition.--Ed.]

[Footnote 3: Quart. Review, vol. ii. p. 187.--Ed.]

[Footnote 4: See vol. i., p. 217.--Ed.]

[Footnote 5:

"And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can he
obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something
by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not
be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or
punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended upon our
obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged
to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of
God."

'Paley's Moral and Polit. Philosophy', B. II. c. 2.

"The difference, and the only difference, ('between prudence and
duty',) is this; that in the one case we consider what we shall gain
or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what
we shall gain or lose in the world to come."

Ib. c. 3.--Ed.]

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