rom Marshal Gerard himself--and his testimony cannot be
suspected--that some days before this battle M. de Bourmont had written
him that, summoned by Louis XVIII., he believed it his duty to go to
him, but promised to guard the most religious silence. He kept his
word, went alone, carried away no plan, and faithfully kept the secret."

The Duke adds:--

"I knew, from Charles X. himself, that he was very greatly surprised at
the accusation of desertion brought against M. de Bourmont when he
appointed him minister. He had not the least idea that that reproach
could be addressed to him, for he knew that the General had but obeyed
the orders of Louis XVIII., his legitimate sovereign."

Does not this phrase show the illusions of which Charles X. was the
victim? He never even suspected that his choice was a challenge to the
old soldiers of the Empire. Yet the violence of the liberal press
certainly extended the range of insult. "As for the other," said the
Journal des Debats disdainfully, "on what field of battle did he win
his epaulets? There are services by which one may profit, which may
even be liberally paid for, but which no people ever dreamed of
honoring." And, as if the allusion was not sufficiently transparent, "I
see," added the same writer, "but one kind of discussion in which the
minister can engage with credit--that of the military code, and the
chapter relating to desertion to the enemy. There are among our new
ministers those who understand the question to perfection." As for the
Figaro, it confined itself to quoting this line from a proclamation of
the General during the Hundred Days: "The cause of the Bourbons is
forever lost! April, 1815.--BOURMONT."

Despite the virulent attacks of the journals, General de Bourmont, who
had distinguished himself on so many battle-fields, had authority with
the troops, and the Expedition of Algiers the next year was to show him
to be a military man of the first order. If Charles X. committed an
error in naming him as minister, he committed a greater one in sending
him away from Paris before the "ordinances," for no one was more
capable of securing the success of a coup d'etat. M. de Chateaubriand
remarks:--

"If the General had been in Paris at the time of the catastrophe, the
vacant portfolio of war would not have fallen into the hands of M. de
Polignac. Before striking the blow, had he consented to it, M. de
Bourmont would beyond doubt have massed at Paris the entire