er any other point than the historic order of the facts with
which it deals. But in so declining to go beyond its self-appointed
task of reconstituting the historic order of events and tracing the
evolution of religion, it does not, thereby, imply that it is
impossible to place them, or correctly place them, in their order of
value. To say that they have no value would be just as absurd as to
say that works of literature or art have no literary or artistic value.
To say that it is difficult to assign their value may be {12} true, but
is no argument against, it is rather a stimulus in favour of, making
the attempt. And it is just the order value, the relative value, of
forms of religion which is of absorbing interest to missionaries. It
is a valuation which is essential to what I have already designated as
the applied science of religion. Thus far in speaking of the
distinction between the historic order in which the various forms of
art, literature, and religion have occurred, and the order of value in
which the soul of every man who is sensible either to art or to
literature or to religion instinctively attempts to place them, I have
necessarily assumed the position of one who looks backward over the
past. It was impossible to compare and contrast the order value with
the historic order, save by doing so. It was necessary to point out
that the very same facts which can be arranged chronologically and in
the order of their evolution can also be--and, as a matter of fact, by
every man are--arranged more or less roughly, more or less correctly,
or incorrectly, in the order of their value. It is now necessary for
us to set our faces towards the future. I say "necessary" for the
simple reason that the idea of "value" carries with it a reference to
the future. If a thing has value, it is because we {13} judge that it
may produce some effect and serve some purpose which we foresee, or at
least surmise. If, on looking back upon past history, we pronounce
that an event had value, we do so because we see that it served, or
might have served, some end of which we approve. Its value is relative
in our eyes to some end or purpose which was relatively future to it.
The objects which we aim at, the ends after which we strive, are in the
future. Those things have value which may subserve our ends and help
us to attain our purposes. And our purposes, our ends, and objects are
in the future. There, there is hope and freedom