eneral
order and good, for God to leave to certain creatures an occasion for the
exercise of their liberty." This argument comes with a bad grace from one
who has already denied the liberty of the will; and, indeed, from the very
form of his expression, Leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority,
rather than from a perception of any support it derives from his own
principles. He asserts the freedom of the will, it is true, but he does
this, as we have seen, only in opposition to the "absolute necessity" of
Hobbes and Spinoza; according to whom nothing in the universe could
possibly have been otherwise than it is. In his "Reflexions sur le Livre
de Hobbes," he says, that although the will is determined in all cases by
the divine omnipotence, yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical
necessity, "because _the contrary volition might happen without implying a
contradiction_." True, the contrary volition might happen without implying
a contradiction; for God himself might cause it to exist. And if, by his
almighty and irresistible power, he should cause it to exist, the will
would still be free in Leibnitz's sense of the word; since its contrary
might have happened. Hence, according to this definition of liberty, if
God should, in all cases, determine the will to good, it would
nevertheless be free; since the contrary determination might have been
produced by his power. In other words, if such be the liberty of the will,
no operation of the Almighty could possibly interfere therewith; as no
volition produced by him would have rendered it impossible for him to have
caused the opposite volition, if he had so chosen and exerted his
omnipotence for that purpose. This defence of the divine procedure, then,
has no foundation in the scheme of Leibnitz; and the only thing he can say
in its favour is, that after the authority "of many good authors," we have
added it to our own views.

Archbishop King, too, as is well known, assumes the ground that God
permits sin, on account of the greater inconvenience that would result to
the world from an interference with the freedom of the will. But so
extravagant are his views respecting this freedom, that the position in
question is one of the weakest parts of his system. The mind chooses
objects, says he, not because they please it; but they are agreeable and
pleasant to the mind, because it chooses them. Surely, such a liberty as
this, consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious