free? Does it
leave them free to depart from the influence of motives? By no means. It
would be a contradiction in terms, according to this argument, to say that
they are certainly and infallibly foreknown, and yet that they may
possibly not come to pass. Hence, if the argument proves anything, it
proves the absolute fatality of all human volitions. It leaves not a
fragment nor a shadow of moral liberty on earth.

If this argument prove anything to the purpose, then Luther was right in
declaring that "the foreknowledge of God is a thunderbolt to dash the
doctrine of free-will into atoms;" and Dr. Dick is right in affirming,
"that it is as impossible to avoid them" (our volitions) "as it is to
pluck the sun out of the firmament."(158) It either proves all the most
absolute necessitarian could desire, or it proves nothing. In our humble
opinion it proves the latter.

On this point the testimony of Dr. Dick himself is explicit: "Whatever is
the foundation of his foreknowledge," says he, "what he does foreknow will
undoubtedly take place. Hence, then, _the actions of men are as
unalterably fixed from eternity, as if they had been the subject of an
immutable decree_."(159) But to dispel this grand illusion, it should be
remembered, that the actions of men will not come to pass because they are
foreknown; but they are foreknown because they will come to pass. The free
actions of men are clearly reflected back in the mirror of the divine
omniscience--they are not projected forward from the engine of the divine
omnipotence.

Since the argument in question proves so much, if it proves anything, we
need not wonder that it was employed by Cicero and other ancient Stoics to
establish the doctrine of an absolute and unconditional fate. "If the will
is free," says he, "then fate does not rule everything, then the order of
all causes is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in
the prescience of God; if the order of things is not certain in the
prescience of God, then things will not take place as he foresees them;
and if things do not take place as he foresees, there is no foreknowledge
in God." Thus, by a _reductio ad absurdum_, he establishes the position
that the will is not free, but fate rules all things. Edwards and Dick,
however, would only apply this argument to human volitions. But are not
the volitions of the divine mind also foreknown? Certainly they are; this
will not be denied. Hence, the very men wh