sly propagated in the provinces, and the
"patriot" party, which was defeated in 1787, was again encouraged to
revolt. Determined not to be drawn into war, the British government, in
July, warned the states-general not to be persuaded to join the allies,
and the Dutch remained neutral. In November, a victorious French army
was on their border, and a strong party among them was ready to
co-operate with it by overthrowing the stadholder as soon as it entered
their territory. England was bound alike by honour and her own interest
to defend the stadholder, and the French knew that, if they desired that
England should remain neutral, they must not molest Holland. On the
13th the states-general applied to England for an assurance of help if
need arose. It was, Pitt felt, "absolutely impossible to hesitate," and
Grenville assured the states-general that England would faithfully
fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of 1788.

[Sidenote: _FRENCH PROVOCATIONS._]

Holland was in imminent danger, and in the hope that some combined
action might lead to a general pacification, the English government
sought to open confidential communications with Austria and Prussia. The
replies of the two powers were delayed; they were arranging for their
respective indemnifications; for their plans were upset by the failure
of their invasion of France. Catherine had invaded Poland in the spring,
and Frederick William, who had more than once guaranteed the integrity
of the kingdom, betrayed the Poles, and agreed with the empress to make
a second partition of Poland between themselves. That was to be his
indemnity; the emperor was to be gratified by being allowed to exchange
the Netherlands for Bavaria. Great Britain protested, but in vain. The
second partition of Poland was carried out in 1793. Scarcely had
Grenville assured the Dutch that England would stand by them, when, on
the 16th, the French executive declared the Scheldt open, and soon
afterwards sent ships of war by it to Antwerp. This decree violated the
rights of the Dutch, which had been confirmed by the treaty of
Fontainebleau in 1785, and which England was bound to defend by the
treaty of 1788. It showed that France assumed the right of subverting
the political system of Europe by setting treaties at nought, and it was
a direct defiance of England.

Nor was this the only provocation which England received. The downfall
of the French monarchy excited the revolutionary societies to fresh