remedies which we find to be feasible we will discuss here only in a
general way. The first, reduction in the intensity of competition, has
hardly been tried in any form, and we cannot yet say what practical
means should be taken to put it into effect. We will return to this at a
later period in our discussion.

The second remedy is the one towards whose adoption we are rapidly
working. State and Interstate Commissions have already been established
to regulate railway monopolies; and in general it is true that the
people who feel the burden of monopolies are looking to the government
for relief, and expect it to take positive action for the control of
other monopolies as it has for the control of railways. It will be seen
that we have now arrived by a study of the various possible remedies for
monopoly at the same irresistible conclusion to which we were brought
by our study of the laws of competition. _The proper remedy for monopoly
is not abolition but control._ It seemed necessary to conduct this
independent investigation in order that no blind adherence to
individualism and no thought of the possible efficacy of other remedies
might lead us to doubt this important truth.

We have next to consider the fact that the government can control
monopolies in two ways. It can either permit the monopoly to remain
under private ownership, and regulate its operations by law and by duly
appointed officers; or it can itself assume the entire ownership and
control of the monopoly. Which of these plans is the better, is a
question of public policy over which future political parties are likely
to dispute. One party will hold that when it is necessary for the
government to interfere to protect those whom it represents from the
oppression of monopoly, it should assume at once the whole ownership and
management of the monopoly. Their opponents will argue that government
should interfere only to the extent needful to maintain the rights of
the public; and that it is far better that industry should be directed
by the private individuals whose interests are at stake than by
government officials. To discuss fully the arguments for each of these
two principles of our future practice in dealing with monopolies, would
be beyond the intended scope of this volume. It can only be briefly said
that the arguments presented will certainly indicate that the conditions
surrounding each given monopoly will have great weight in determining
which po