uently, can only be secured by the adoption of a method of
selecting departmental chiefs which will tend to make them expert public
servants rather than politicians. They must be divorced from political
associations. They must be emancipated from political vicissitudes. The
success of their career must depend exclusively upon the excellence of
their departmental work.

As long as these public servants are elected, no such result can be
expected. The practice of electing the incumbents of subordinate
executive positions inevitably invites the evasion of responsibility and
the selection of the candidate chiefly for partisan service. When such a
man stands for renomination or reelection, his administrative efficiency
or inefficiency (unless the latter should chance to be particularly
flagrant) does not affect his chances. He is renominated in case he has
served his party well, or in case no one else who wants the job has in
the meantime served it better. He is reelected in case his party happens
to have kept public confidence. Departmental chiefs can be made
responsible for their work only by being subordinated to a chief
executive whose duty it is to keep his eye on his subordinates and who
is accountable to the people for the efficient conduct of all the
administrative offices. The former, consequently, must be selected by
appointment, they must be installed in office for an indefinite period,
and they must be subject to removal by the chief executive. Those are
terms upon which all private employees serve; and on no other terms will
equally efficient results be obtained from public officials.

Under a democratic political system there is, of course, no way of
absolutely guaranteeing that any method of administrative organization,
however excellent in itself, will accomplish the desired and the
desirable result. Administrative authority must at some point always
originate in an election. The election can delegate power only for a
limited period. At the end of the limited period another executive will
be chosen--possibly a man representing a wholly different political
policy. Such a man will want his immediate advisers to share his
political point of view; and it is always possible that in electing him
the voters will make a mistake and choose an incompetent and
irresponsible person. An incompetent or disloyal executive could
undoubtedly under such a system do much to disorganize the public
service; but what will you hav