make nothing of it, why did you undertake it?"

"I only undertook to think about it," said Thorndyke. "I never reject a
case off-hand unless it is obviously fishy. It is surprising how
difficulties, and even impossibilities, dwindle if you look at them
attentively. My experience has taught me that the most unlikely case is,
at least, worth thinking over."

"By the way, why do you want to look over Jeffrey's chambers? What do
you expect to find there?"

"I have no expectations at all. I am simply looking for stray facts."

"And all those questions that you asked Stephen Blackmore; had you
nothing in your mind--no definite purpose?"

"No purpose beyond getting to know as much about the case as I can."

"But," I exclaimed, "do you mean that you are going to examine those
rooms without any definite object at all?"

"I wouldn't say that," replied Thorndyke. "This is a legal case. Let me
put an analogous medical case as being more within your present sphere.
Supposing that a man should consult you, say, about a progressive loss
of weight. He can give no explanation. He has no pain, no discomfort, no
symptoms of any kind; in short, he feels perfectly well in every
respect; <i>but</i> he is losing weight continuously. What would you do?"

"I should overhaul him thoroughly," I answered.

"Why? What would you expect to find?"

"I don't know that I should start by expecting to find anything in
particular. But I should overhaul him organ by organ and function by
function, and if I could find nothing abnormal I should have to give it
up."

"Exactly," said Thorndyke. "And that is just my position and my line of
action. Here is a case which is perfectly regular and straightforward
excepting in one respect. It has a single abnormal feature. And for that
abnormality there is nothing to account.

"Jeffrey Blackmore made a will. It was a well-drawn will and it
apparently gave full effect to his intentions. Then he revoked that will
and made another. No change had occurred in his circumstances or in his
intentions. The provisions of the new will were believed by him to be
identical with those of the old one. The new will differed from the old
one only in having a defect in the drafting from which the first will
was free, and of which he must have been unaware. Now why did he revoke
the first will and replace it with another which he believed to be
identical in its provisions? There is no answer to that question. It is
an abn