ddle course. The preamble was softened down: a
clause was added which provided that Oates should still remain incapable
of being a witness; and the bill thus altered was returned to the
Commons.

The Commons were not satisfied. They rejected the amendments,
and demanded a free conference. Two eminent Tories, Rochester and
Nottingham, took their seats in the Painted Chamber as managers for the
Lords. With them was joined Burnet, whose well known hatred of Popery
was likely to give weight to what he might say on such an occasion.
Somers was the chief orator on the other side; and to his pen we owe a
singularly lucid and interesting abstract of the debate.

The Lords frankly owned that the judgment of the Court of King's Bench
could not be defended. They knew it to be illegal, and had known it to
be so even when they affirmed it. But they had acted for the best. They
accused Oates of bringing an impudently false accusation against Queen
Catherine: they mentioned other instances of his villany; and they asked
whether such a man ought still to be capable of giving testimony in a
court of justice. The only excuse which, in their opinion, could be made
for him was, that he was insane; and in truth, the incredible insolence
and absurdity of his behaviour when he was last before them seemed to
warrant the belief that his brain had been turned, and that he was not
to be trusted with the lives of other men. The Lords could not therefore
degrade themselves by expressly rescinding what they had done; nor could
they consent to pronounce the verdict corrupt on no better evidence than
common report.

The reply was complete and triumphant. "Oates is now the smallest part
of the question. He has, Your Lordships say, falsely accused the Queen
Dowager and other innocent persons. Be it so. This bill gives him no
indemnity. We are quite willing that, if he is guilty, he shall be
punished. But for him, and for all Englishmen, we demand that punishment
shall be regulated by law, and not by the arbitrary discretion of any
tribunal. We demand that, when a writ of error is before Your Lordships,
you shall give judgment on it according to the known customs and
statutes of the realm. We deny that you have any right, on such
occasions, to take into consideration the moral character of a plaintiff
or the political effect of a decision. It is acknowledged by yourselves
that you have, merely because you thought ill of this man, affirmed
a judgment w