ry. I will do
this: I have thirty days before I must make up my mind to sign
the bill, or let it become a law without my signature. Within
that thirty days I will call the legislature together again. Then
you can prepare and submit to me a proper bill, and if we can
agree upon it, I will present it to the legislature. If the
legislature passes that measure I will sign it, but if it does
not, I will let the present measure, bad as it is, become a law."

The result of the threat was that a very good and timely act was
presented in regard to the taxation of public utilities, a measure
which largely increased municipal and State revenues. I know
of no governor in my time who would have had the originality and
the audacity to accomplish what he desired by such drastic operation.

Roosevelt's administration was high-minded and patriotic. But by
his exercise of independent judgment and frequently by doing
things without consulting the leaders, State or local, he became
exceedingly unpopular with the organization. It was evident that
it would be very difficult to renominate him. It was also evident
that on account of his popularity with the people, if he failed
in the renomination, the party would be beaten. So it was unanimously
decided to put him on the national ticket as vice-president.

The governor resisted this with all his passionate energy. He
liked the governorship. He thought there were many things which
he could do in another term, and he believed and so stated that
the vice-presidency was a tomb. He thought that nobody could be
resurrected when once buried in that sarcophagus.

The national Republican convention of 1900 was a ratification
meeting. President McKinley's administration had been exceedingly
popular. The convention met practically to indorse McKinley's
public acts and renominate him for another term. The only doubtful
question was the vice-presidency. There was a general accord
of sentiment in favor of Governor Roosevelt, which was only
blocked by his persistent refusal.

Roosevelt and I were both delegates at large, and that position
gave him greater opportunity to emphasize his disinclination.
A very intimate friend of his called upon me and begged that
I would use all my influence to prevent the colonel's nomination.
This friend said to me: "The governor's situation, officially and
personally, makes it impossible for him to go to Washington. On
the official side are his unfin