itate one of three objects,--things as they were or are,
things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be.
The vehicle of expression is language,--either current terms or, it
may be, rare words or metaphors. There are also many modifications of
language, which we concede to the poets. Add to this, that the standard
of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in
poetry and any other art. Within the art of poetry itself there are
two kinds of faults, those which touch its essence, and those which are
accidental. If a poet has chosen to imitate something, <but has imitated
it incorrectly> through want of capacity, the error is inherent in
the poetry. But if the failure is due to a wrong choice if he has
represented a horse as throwing out both his off legs at once, or
introduced technical inaccuracies in medicine, for example, or in any
other art the error is not essential to the poetry. These are the points
of view from which we should consider and answer the objections raised
by the critics.

First as to matters which concern the poet's own art. If he describes
the impossible, he is guilty of an error; but the error may be
justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained (the end being that
already mentioned), if, that is, the effect of this or any other part of
the poem is thus rendered more striking. A case in point is the pursuit
of Hector. If, however, the end might have been as well, or better,
attained without violating the special rules of the poetic art, the
error is not justified: for every kind of error should, if possible, be
avoided.

Again, does the error touch the essentials of the poetic art, or some
accident of it? For example,--not to know that a hind has no horns is a
less serious matter than to paint it inartistically.

Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, the
poet may perhaps reply,--'But the objects are as they ought to be': just
as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides,
as they are. In this way the objection may be met. If, however, the
representation be of neither kind, the poet may answer,--This is how men
say the thing is.' This applies to tales about the gods. It may well be
that these stories are not higher than fact nor yet true to fact: they
are, very possibly, what Xenophanes says of them. But anyhow, 'this
is what is said.' Again, a description may be no better than the fact:
'sti