them falling into the hands of the enemy alive. The loss of this body
of cavalry was considerably more detrimental to Hannibal than that of
Salapia, for the Carthaginian was never afterwards superior in
cavalry, in which he had before been most effective.
39. During this time the scarcity of provisions in the citadel of
Tarentum was almost intolerable; the Roman garrison there, and Marcus
Livius, the praefect of the garrison and the citadel, placing all
their dependence in the supplies sent from Sicily; that these might
safely pass along the coast of Italy, a fleet of about twenty ships
was stationed at Rhegium. Decius Quinctius, a man of obscure birth,
but who had acquired great renown as a soldier, on account of many
acts of bravery, had charge of the fleet and the convoys. At first he
had five ships, the largest of which were two triremes, given to him
by Marcellus, but afterwards, in consequence of his spirited conduct
on many occasions, three quinqueremes were added to his number, at
last, by exacting from the allied states of Rhegium, Velia, and
Paestum, the ships they were bound to furnish according to treaty, he
made up a fleet of twenty ships, as was before stated. This fleet
setting out from Rhegium, was met at Sacriportus, about fifteen miles
from the city by Democrates, with an equal number of Tarentine ships.
It happened that the Roman was then coming with his sails up, not
expecting an approaching contest, but in the neighbourhood of Croto
and Sybaris, he had supplied his ships with rowers, and had his fleet
excellently equipped and armed for the size of his vessels, and it
also happened, that just at the time when the enemy were in sight, the
wind completely fell, so that there was sufficient time to furl their
sails, and get their rowers and soldiers in readiness for the
approaching action. Rarely elsewhere have regular fleets engaged with
so much spirit, for they fought for what was of greater importance
than the fleets themselves. The Tarentines, in order that, having
recovered their city from the Romans after the lapse of almost a
century, they might also rescue their citadel, hoping also to cut off
the supplies of their enemy, if by a naval battle they could deprive
them of the dominion of the sea. The Romans, that, by keeping
possession of the citadel, they might prove that Tarentum was lost not
by the strength and valour of their enemies, but by treachery and
stealth. Accordingly, the signal havi
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