any such imputation as to their own state of mind, they have the
feeling that people with religious convictions are prone to see only
one side, and, therefore, anything that may be said on the other side
is only a bit of special pleading for a conviction that no reasoning
and no argument would change. They argue, as a consequence, that it
would be quite useless for them to read the other side with any
reasonable hope of getting at the real facts. This attitude of
scientists is very different from the open-mindedness that is supposed
to be characteristic of the devotees of science; but it is very human.
Now the interesting fact with regard to Professor Draper's books is
that Professor Draper, a scientist, did not know the history of
science at all. He was entirely ignorant of the great advances that
were even then being made, with regard to our knowledge of the growth
of science during the medieval period. He thought that there was very
little, indeed practically no science, during that period. Looking
about for a reason, he made the Church a scapegoat. The publication
during the past generation of many German volumes on the history of
the different sciences--and these German students went straight to the
original documents--has shown us that there were magnificent
developments of science during the medieval and early Renaissance
periods, when the Church was in control of the educational
institutions and of every phase of {504} academic work. The story of
the opposition between religion and science falls to the ground at
once when these facts are known. Some of them were already in process
of publication even in Draper's time, but he knew nothing of them. He
was so sure that there was nothing to know in this matter, that he
probably did not bother his head very much about trying to get the
latest results of scholarship in the matter.
Professor Draper's summary of the relations of the Church to science
or learning, and his declaration of her absolute refusal to recognize
anything as scholarship, except what was deduced from the Scriptures,
shows how far a man can go in his assumption of knowledge when he
knows literally nothing about a subject. For him the Dark Ages knew
nothing because he knows nothing about them. If they knew anything, he
would know it, but he does not. Of one or two men he knows something,
but they are exceptions to the general rule of absolute negation of
intellectual interests and developments.
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