ted recruits. General A. J. Smith's veteran corps had
been ordered from Missouri, and a great parade has been made of this fact
by those whose interest it was to show that Thomas had been left with a
competent force. But the fact that it did not arrive at Nashville till
after the battle of Franklin, and that Thomas was waiting for it as well
as to remount the cavalry, was not so loudly proclaimed.

However, when Sherman was ready to start for the sea, with Hood's veteran
army concentrated behind him, and Thomas, with the above mentioned
elements of an army scattered over a territory as large as France, had
been assigned to take care of Hood, General Sherman telegraphed Halleck:
"I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered Thomas
to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Ala." And General
Grant, after receiving some inflated figures of a great force left with
Thomas, telegraphed Sherman: "With the force you have left with Thomas, he
must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him." Later, when the
anxiety at City Point referred to in the opening of this paper had become
intense, the margin of force with which General Thomas was really
operating was found to be so small that General Grant suggested that he
should "arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees,
citizens, etc.," and again, a few hours later, he was suggesting what he
could do "with your citizen employees armed."

CONCENTRATING IN FRONT OF HOOD.

It was under such circumstances and conditions which, after all, are but
faintly shadowed forth by the facts here stated, that General Thomas began
to concentrate his conglomerate forces in Hood's front, and begin under
fire the work of organizing and refitting an army. With superhuman effort,
and such loyal assistance and energy from officers and soldiers as were
not elsewhere exhibited during the war, because not previously required,
General Thomas set about the task of preparing the means of overthrowing
Hood. Deliberate action and the extreme of prudence were essentials of the
situation. The objective of Hood's campaign, under suggestions from
President Davis, was the Ohio River. There was no reserve force in sight
or within summoning distance, or immediately available anywhere in case of
reverses. Thomas could not afford to take the slightest risks so long as
his own position was not imperilled. It was not alone the immediate
interests confided to his keeping and de