e of policy was in part due to the
activity of the first {312} lord of the Admiralty, Mr Winston
Churchill. Whether moved by his own impetuous temperament or by the
advice of others, Mr Churchill threw overboard the M'Kenna memorandum,
and endeavoured once more to revive the contribution policy. He was
not content with laying before the Canadian prime minister the opinion
of experts on the strategic questions involved, and advising on means
to reach the desired end, but sought to influence public opinion in the
Dominions by word and act. The memoranda sent at Sir Robert Borden's
request in January 1913, emphasizing the difficulty of building
battleships in Canada--which was not proposed by the Opposition--and
the difficulty of helping to man the two Canadian fleet units--though
at the same time men were declared to be available for as many as five
Dreadnoughts, if contributed--were preceded by pressure on the Malay
States to contribute a battleship, and were followed by Mr Churchill's
announcement of his intention to establish at Gibraltar an Imperial
Squadron composed of Dominion ships, under the Admiralty's control.
When Australia suggested that a special Dominion Conference to discuss
the matter should be held in Canada, New Zealand, or Australia, {313}
the United Kingdom would not consent. It was made emphatically clear
that Mr Churchill was in favour of contribution, not as an emergency
but as a permanent policy. It was his doubtless well-meant--and
invited--intervention in the dispute, ignoring the principles by which
imperial harmony had been secured in the past, which more than anything
else stirred up resentment in Canada.

The dispute in Canada turned partly on constitutional, and partly on
technical, naval considerations. A Canadian navy was opposed by some
as tending to separation from the Empire, and by others as involving
Canada in a share in war without any corresponding share in foreign
policy. It was defended as the logical extension of the policy of
self-government, which, in actual practice as opposed to pessimistic
prophecy, had proved the enduring basis of imperial union. The
considerations involved have been briefly reviewed in an earlier
section. It need only be noted here that the constitutional problem
was no more acute in December 1912 than in March 1909. Whatever the
difficulties, they had been faced and accepted by all the other
Dominions. Australia was irretrievably and proudly co