considered it from every
standpoint, and it had seemed, at the time, that no one but Paul could
have used it.

"This," said Paul, "is the one definite thing urged against me.
Everything else is pure surmise, but the knife was known to be mine.
The knife was in my office, an office which is always locked when I
have occasion to leave it. Therefore, no one but myself could have
used it. Such is the counsel's argument. Again I ask you to consider
this carefully. Remember that no secret was ever made about my
possessing this knife. It had been sent to me by a customer from
abroad. It had been used as a paper-knife. It had been frequently
seen by those who visited me lying on my office desk. It was not some
secret thing, something about which the world knew nothing. It was
known to be mine by scores of people--please bear that in mind. Then
there is another thing-. It has come out in the evidence that I was
not in the habit of carrying it. It is a sharp, murderous-looking
blade, and it has been examined, my lord, not only by you, but by every
member of the jury. I admit that this knife is mine. I admit all that
my partner, Mr. George Preston, has said about it. But I want you to
consider the tremendous gap between the fact of the knife known to
belong to me, and the accusation that with this knife I murdered Mr.
Edward Wilson. Now, will you please think carefully. It has been
urged that I did this deed in cold blood. It was between three and
four o'clock in the afternoon when I had a quarrel with Wilson and he
struck me down. My servants have given testimony to the fact that I
came home, talked with my mother, went into my study, stayed there for
several hours. Then it is urged that I went out, carrying this knife
with me; and, mark you, they did not see the knife in the house, no one
saw me take it away from the office; but it is urged that I went out,
after several hours' cool and calculated thought, at midnight; that I
caught the murdered man unawares, drove the knife into his body, and
then ran away and left it there. Now, think of this, gentlemen, and
remember that my life or death depends upon the reasonableness of it,
depends upon this link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. It has
been urged again and again that whatever I am, I am not a fool, that I
am capable of careful and connected thought, that I commenced my career
in Brunford in a very small way, and that in a few years I have made