arties
called the Greenback party, who favored an increase of United States
notes, and the payment of all United States bonds and securities
in such notes. This difference of opinion continued until the
resumption of specie payments, in January, 1879.

I propose to state here the measures adopted in respect to the
national currency and debt during the rest of the administration
of President Johnson.

The total debt of the United States on the 31st of October, 1865,
was $2,808,549,437.55 in twenty-five different forms of indebtedness
of which, $1,200,000,000 was payable at the option of the Secretary
of the Treasury, or within a brief period. The amount of United
States notes outstanding was then $428,160,569, and of fractional
currency $26,057,469, in all $545,218,038. All of this money was
in active circulation, in great favor among the people, worth in
use as much as national bank notes, and rapidly rising in value
compared with coin. It was the least burdensome form of indebtedness
then existing. The treasury notes and compound interest notes were
in express terms payable in this lawful money, and, therefore, bore
a higher rate of interest than the bonds, which, by their express
terms or necessary implication, were payable in coin only.

It was insisted that the amount of United States notes was in excess
of what was needed for currency in time of peace and might safely
be gradually reduced. This effort to contract the currency was
firmly resisted by several Senators, myself among them. The Supreme
Court decided that Congress had full power to make these notes a
legal tender. They were far better than any form of currency
previously existing in the United States. During the war, when
the expenditures of the government reached nearly $1,000,000,000
a year they were indispensable. Those most opposed to irredeemable
paper money acknowledged this necessity. The only objection to
them was that they were not equivalent to coin in purchasing power.
After the war was over, the general desire of all was to advance
these notes nearer to par with coin, but not to withdraw them.
The rising credit and financial strength of the United States would,
it was believed, bring them to par without injustice to the debtor,
but the rapid withdrawal of the notes would add to the burden of
debts and cripple all forms of industry. It would convert the
compound interest notes and treasury notes bearing seven and three
tenths p