executive to use that sum, and no more, especially for
that purpose, and no other, and within the time fixed."

I pointed out cases where the departments assumed the power to
transfer appropriations made for one purpose, to other purposes in
the same department. Another abuse by the executive departments
was the habit of making contracts in advance of appropriations,
thus, without law, compelling Congress to sanction them or violate
the public faith. All these evils have since been remedied by
restrictive legislation. The habit of the Senate to load down
appropriation bills with amendments already refused by the House
of Representatives, and then insist that, if not agreed to, the
bill would fail, was more frequent then than now, but under the
practice now established an amendment finally disagreed to by either
House is abandoned.

An illustration of the former practice in the Senate occurred in
the 36th Congress, when I was chairman of the committee on ways
and means. An appropriation bill was loaded down with amendments,
among them an appropriation of $500,000 each for the construction
of public buildings in Charleston and New Orleans. The amendments
were disagreed to and referred to a committee of conference, of
which Senator Toombs was a member. His first expression in the
committee was that the House must agree to the items for Charleston
and New Orleans or the bill would fail. I promptly answered that
I would report what he said to the House, and _the bill would fail_.
He said nothing further, the conference agreed, and the bill passed
without any mention of Charleston or New Orleans. Even now the
abuse I refer to sometimes occurs, but the general rule and practice
is to exclude any item of an appropriation bill not freely agreed
to by both Houses.

It was generally agreed that the views expressed by me on the 27th
of May were sound in principle, but the strong partisan feeling
that ran through the speech weakened its effect. I insert the last
two paragraphs:

"But, sir, I have no hope, while this House is constituted as it
is now, of instituting any radical reform. I believe that the
House of Representatives should be in opposition to the President.
We know the intimate relations made by party ties and party feelings.
We know that with a party House, a House a majority of whose Members
are friends of the President, it is impossible to bring about a
reform. It is only by a firm, able, and determin