the Duke of Cumberland, forming together a force of between seventeen
and eighteen thousand strong, there was a third army, encamped on
Finchley Common, of which George the Second was going to take the
command in person. Even supposing that the Prince should be successful
in an engagement with one of these armies, "he might be undone by a
victory." The loss of one thousand or fifteen hundred men would
incapacitate the rest of his small force from another encounter; and
supposing that he was routed in that country, he and all his friends
must unavoidably be killed. On the whole, including the army formed at
London, there would be a force of thirty thousand men to oppose an army
of five thousand fighting men; that before such a host, pursued Lord
George,[127] "it could not be supposed one man could escape; for the
militia, who had not appeared much against us hitherto, would, upon our
defeat, possess all the roads, and the enemy's horse would surround us
on all hands; that the whole world would blame us as being rash and
foolish, to venture a thing that could not succeed, and the Prince's
person, should he escape being killed in the battle, must fall into the
enemy's hands."

"His Royal Highness," continues Lord George Murray in his narrative,
"had no regard to his own danger, but pressed with all the force of
argument to go forward. He did not doubt but the justness of his cause
would prevail, and he could not think of retreating after coming so far;
and he was hopeful there might be a defection in the enemy's army, and
that several would declare for him. He was so very bent on putting all
to the risk, that the Duke of Perth was for it, since his Royal Highness
was. At last, he proposed going to Wales, instead of returning to
Carlisle, but every other officer declared his opinion for a retreat,
which some thought would be scarce practicable. I said all that I
thought of to persuade the retreat, and, indeed, the arguments to me
seemed unanswerable; and for the danger, though I owned an army upon a
retreat did not fight with equal valour as when they advanced, yet, if
the thing were agreed to, I offered to make the retreat, and be always
in the rear myself; and that each regiment would take it by turns till
we came to Carlisle; and that the army should march in such order, that
if I were attacked, I might be supported as occasion required, and
without stopping the army (except a very great body of the enemy should
be upon