o, was always believed to have a
working agreement with the Turk; Barbarossa was giving no little cause
for alarm in the Mediterranean; while Henry on his part had established
close relations with Luebeck and Hamburg, and was fomenting dissensions
in Denmark, the crown of which he was offered but cautiously (p. 312)
declined.[882]

[Footnote 877: _Ibid._, vi., 774. The sense of this
passage is spoilt in _L. and P._ by the comma being
placed after "better" instead of after "is".]

[Footnote 878: Control over England was the great
objective of Habsburg policy. In 1513 Margaret of
Savoy was pressing Henry to have the succession
settled on his sister Mary, then betrothed to
Charles himself (_ibid._, i., 4833).]

[Footnote 879: _L. and P._, vii., 229. All that
Charles thought practicable was to "embarrass Henry
in his own kingdom, and to execute what the Emperor
wrote to the Irish chiefs" (_cf._ vii., 342, 353).]

[Footnote 880: _Ibid._, vi., 351. Charles's conduct
is a striking vindication of Wolsey's foresight in
1528, when he told Campeggio that the Emperor would
not wage war over the divorce of Catherine, and
said there would be a thousand ways of keeping on
good terms with him (Ehses, _Roemische Dokumente_,
p. 69; _L. and P._, iv., 4881). Dr. Gairdner thinks
Wolsey was insincere in this remark (_English Hist.
Rev._, xii., 242), but he seems to have gauged
Charles V.'s character and embarrassments
accurately.]

[Footnote 881: _L. and P._, vi., 863. Her departure
would have prejudiced Mary's claim to the throne,
but Charles's advice was particularly callous in
view of the reports which Chapuys was sending
Charles of her treatment.]

[Footnote 882: _L. and P._, vii., 737, 871, 957-58,
and vol. viii., _passim_; _cf._ C.F. Wurm, _Die
politischen Beziehungen Heinrichs VIII. zu Mercus
Meyer und Juergen Wullenwever_, Ha