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products of child labor--pernicious because it bore "a real and substantial relation" to the existence of child labor employment in some States and constituted a direct inducement to its spread to other States. Deprived of the interstate market which this decision secured to it, child labor could not exist. INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN STOLEN GOODS BANNED In Brooks _v._ United States,[516] decided in 1925, the Court, in sustaining the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919,[517] materially impaired the _ratio decidendi_ of Hammer _v._ Dagenhart. At the outset of his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft stated the general proposition that "Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin." This statement was buttressed by a review of previous cases, including the explanation that the goods involved in Hammer _v._ Dagenhart were "harmless" and did not spread harm to persons in other States. Passing then to the measure before the Court, the Chief Justice noted "the radical change in transportation" brought about by the automobile, and the rise of "elaborately organized conspiracies for the theft of automobiles * * *, and their sale or other disposition" in another police jurisdiction from the owner's. This, the opinion declared, "is a gross misuse of interstate commerce. Congress may properly punish such interstate transportation by anyone with knowledge of the theft, because of its harmful result and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions."[518] The Motor Vehicle Act was sustained, therefore, mainly as protective of owners of automobiles, that is to say, of interests in "the State of origin." It was designed to repress automobile thefts, and that notwithstanding the obvious fact that such thefts must necessarily occur before transportation of the thing stolen can take place, that is, under the formula followed in Hammer _v._ Dagenhart, before Congress's power over interstate commerce becomes operative. Also, the Court took cognizance of "elaborately organized conspiracies" for the theft and disposal of automobiles across State lines--that, to say, of a widespread traffic in such property. THE DARBY CASE The formal overruling of Ham
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