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e Selective Service Act was repugnant to the First Amendment as establishing or interfering with religion, by reason of the exemptions granted ministers of religion, theological students and members of sects whose tenets exclude the moral right to engage in war.[63] The opposite aspect of this problem was presented in Hamilton _v._ Regents.[64] There a California statute requiring all male students at the State university to take a course in military science and tactics was assailed by students who claimed that military training was contrary to the precepts of their religion. This act did not require military service, nor did it peremptorily command submission to military training. The obligation to take such training was imposed only as a condition of attendance at the university. In these circumstances, all members of the Court concurred in the judgment sustaining the statute. No such unanimity of opinion prevailed in In re Summers,[65] where the Court upheld the action of a State Supreme Court in denying a license to practice law to an applicant who entertained conscientious scruples against participation in war. The license was withheld on the premise that a conscientious belief in nonviolence to the extent that the believer would not use force to prevent wrong, no matter how aggravated, made it impossible for him to swear in good faith to support the State Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the State's insistence that an officer charged with the administration of justice take such an oath and its interpretation of that oath to require a willingness to perform military service, did not abridge religious freedom. In a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge concurred, Justice Black said, "I cannot agree that a State can lawfully bar from a semipublic position a well-qualified man of good character solely because he entertains a religious belief which might prompt him at some time in the future to violate a law which has not yet been and may never be enacted."[66] Freedom of Speech and Press THE BLACKSTONIAN BACKGROUND "The liberty of the press," says Blackstone, "is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the fre
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