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ly to a condition of disorder. [409] 158 U.S. at 584, 586. Some years earlier, in the United States _v._ San Jacinto Tin Co., the Courts sustained the right of the Attorney General and of his assistants to institute suits simply by virtue of their general official powers. "If," the Court said, "the United States in any particular case has a just cause for calling upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts, for relief * * *" in the question of appealing to them "must primarily be decided by the Attorney General * * *" and if restrictions are to be placed upon the exercise of this authority it is for Congress to enact them. 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888). _Cf._ Hayburn's case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), in which the Court rejected Attorney General Randolph's contention that he had the right _ex officio_ to move for a writ of _mandamus_ ordering the United States circuit court for Pennsylvania to put the Invalid Pension Act into effect. [410] 29 U.S.C. Sec. 101-105; 47 Stat. 70 (1932). [411] 330 U.S. 258. Here it was held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to a case brought by the government as operator, under the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, of a large proportion of the nation's soft coal mines. In reaching this result Chief Justice Vinson invoked the "rule that statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect." Standing by itself these words would seem to save the Debs case. But they do not stand by themselves, for the Chief Justice presently added "that Congress, in passing the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act, did not intend to permit the United States to continue to intervene by injunction in purely private labor disputes. * * * where some public interest was thought to have become involved," words which seem intended to repudiate the Debs case. However, the Chief Justice goes on at once to say, "* * * whether Congress so intended or not is a question different from the one before us now." Ibid. 272, 278. [412] Public Law 101, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Sec. 206-210. [413] _See_ Louis Stark in New York Times, February 4, 1949; Labor Relations, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 263, 285, 295, 905, 911; Julius and Lillian Cohen, The Divine Rights of Presidents, 29 Nebraska Law Review, p. 416, March 1950. [414] 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 291, 292, 293. [
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