n, and not Fouquier Tinville,
notwithstanding all that has been written on this subject by persons
calling themselves well-informed, and even some of the accused's
intimate friends.

The catastrophe of the Champ de Mars, when impartially examined in its
essential phases, presents some very simple problems:

Was a petition to the Constituent Assembly illegal that was got up on
the 17th of July, 1791, against a decree issued on the 15th?

Had the petitioners, by assembling on the Champ de Mars, violated any
law?

Could the two murders committed in the morning be imputed to these men?

Had projects of disorder and rebellion been manifested with sufficient
evidence to justify the proclamation of martial law, and especially the
putting it into practice?

I say it, Gentlemen, with deep grief, these problems will be answered in
the negative by whoever takes the trouble to analyze without passion,
and without preconceived opinions, some authentic documents, which
people in general seem to have made it a point to leave in oblivion. But
I hasten to add, that considering the question as to intention, Bailly
will continue to appear, after this examination, quite as humane, quite
as honourable, quite as pure as we have found him to be in the other
phases of a public and private life, which might serve as a model.

In the best epochs of the National Assembly, no one who belonged to it
would have dared to maintain, that to draw up and sign a petition,
whatever might be the object of it, were rebellious acts. Never, at that
time, would the President of that great Assembly have called down hate,
public vengeance, or a sanguinary repression upon those who attempted,
said Charles Lameth, in the sitting of the 16th of July, "to oppose
their individual will to the law, which is an expression of the national
will." The right of petition seemed as if it ought to be absolute, even
if contrary to sanctioned and promulgated laws in full action, and even
more so against legislative arrangements still under discussion, or
scarcely voted.

The petitioners of the Champ de Mars asked the Constituent Assembly to
revise a decree that they had issued two days before. We have no
occasion to examine whether the act was reasonable, opportune, dictated
by an enlightened view of the public good. The question is simple; in
soliciting the Assembly to revise a decree, they violated no law.
Perhaps it will be thought that the petitioners at least commit