rom
oppressive rulers, but to secure national independence. As such, it is
invested with great interest. Moreover, it was glorious, since it was
ultimately successful, after a dreadful contest with Turkey for seven
years, during which half of the population was swept away. Greece
probably would have succumbed to a powerful empire but for the aid
tardily rendered her by foreign Powers,--united in this instance, not to
suppress rebellion, but to rescue a noble and gallant people from a
cruel despotism.

Had the armed intervention of Russia, England, and France taken place at
an earlier period, much suffering and bloodshed might have been averted.
But Russia was fettered by the Holy Alliance to suppress all
insurrection and attempts at constitutional liberty wherever they might
take place, and could not, consistently with the promises given to
Austria and Prussia, join in an armed intervention, even in a matter
dear to the heart of Alexander, whose religion was that of Greece. The
Czar was placed in an awkward position. If he gave assistance to the
Greeks, whose religious faith was the same as his own and whose foe was
also the traditionary enemy of Russia, he would violate his promises,
which he always held sacred, and give umbrage to Austria. The intolerant
hatred of Alexander for all insurrections whatever induced him to stand
aloof from a contest which jeoparded the stability of thrones, and with
which in a political view, as an absolute sovereign, he had no sympathy.
On the other hand, if Alexander remained neutral, his faith would be
trodden under foot, and that by a power which he detested both
politically and religiously,--a power, too, with which Russia had often
been at war. If Turkey triumphed in the contest, rebels against a
long-constituted authority might indeed be put down; but a hostile power
would be strengthened, dangerous to all schemes of Russian
aggrandizement. Consequently Alexander was undecided in his policy; yet
his indecision tore his mind with anguish, and probably shortened his
days. He was, on the whole, a good man; but he was a despot, and did not
really know what to do. England and France, again, were weakened by the
long wars of Napoleon, and wanted repose. Their sympathies were with the
Greeks; but they shielded themselves behind the principles of
non-intervention, which were the public law of Europe.

So the poor Greeks were left for six years to struggle alone and unaided
against the wh