on the duration of
hostilities. That is to say, that as the shorter the duration of the
war, the greater would be the benefit to the country, therefore, the
larger must be the pay to the Syndicate. According to the proposed
contract, the Syndicate would receive, if the war should continue for a
year, one-quarter the sum stipulated to be paid if peace should be
declared in three months.

If at any time during the conduct of the war by the Syndicate an
American seaport should be taken by the enemy, or a British force
landed on any point of the seacoast, the contract should be considered
at an end, and security and payment forfeited. If any point on the
northern boundary of the United States should be taken and occupied by
the enemy, one million dollars of the deposited security should be
forfeited for every such occupation, but the contract should continue.

It was stipulated that the land and naval forces of the United States
should remain under the entire control of the Government, but should be
maintained as a defensive force, and not brought into action unless any
failure on the part of the Syndicate should render such action
necessary.

The state of feeling in governmental circles, and the evidences of
alarm and distrust which were becoming apparent in Congress and among
the people, exerted an important influence in favour of the Syndicate.
The Government caught at its proposition, not as if it were a straw,
but as if it were a life-raft. The men who offered to relieve the
executive departments of their perilous responsibilities were men of
great ability, prominent positions, and vast resources, whose vast
enterprises had already made them known all over the globe. Such men
were not likely to jeopardize their reputations and fortunes in a case
like this, unless they had well-founded reasons for believing that they
would be successful. Even the largest amount stipulated to be paid
them in case of success would be less than the ordinary estimates for
the military and naval operations which had been anticipated; and in
case of failure, the amount forfeited would go far to repair the losses
which might be sustained by the citizens of the various States.

At all events, should the Syndicate be allowed to take immediate
control of the war, there would be time to put the army and navy,
especially the latter, in better condition to carry on the contest in
case of the failure of the Syndicate. Organization and cons