hat of
discovering what this native fund of power is, and then of utilizing it
in such a way (affording conditions which both stimulate and control) as
to organize it into definite conserved modes of action--habits.

(2) But something more is required than sheer force. Sheer force may be
brutal; it may override the interests of others. Even when aiming at
right ends it may go at them in such a way as to violate the rights of
others. More than this, in sheer force there is no guarantee for the
right end. Efficiency may be directed towards mistaken ends and result
in positive mischief and destruction. Power, as already suggested, must
be directed. It must be organized along social channels; it must be
attached to valuable ends.

This involves training on both the intellectual and emotional side. On
the intellectual side we must have judgment--what is ordinarily called
good sense. The difference between mere knowledge, or information, and
judgment is that the former is simply held, not used; judgment is
knowledge directed with reference to the accomplishment of ends. Good
judgment is a sense of respective or proportionate values. The one who
has judgment is the one who has ability to size up a situation. He is
the one who can grasp the scene or situation before him, ignoring what
is irrelevant, or what for the time being is unimportant, who can seize
upon the factors which demand attention, and grade them according to
their respective claims. Mere knowledge of what the right is, in the
abstract, mere intentions of following the right in general, however
praiseworthy in themselves, are never a substitute for this power of
trained judgment. Action is always in the concrete. It is definite and
individualized. Except, therefore, as it is backed and controlled by a
knowledge of the actual concrete factors in the situation in which it
occurs, it must be relatively futile and waste.

(3) But the consciousness of ends must be more than merely intellectual.
We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet does not
act upon his judgment. There must not only be force to insure effort in
execution against obstacles, but there must also be a delicate personal
responsiveness,--there must be an emotional reaction. Indeed, good
judgment is impossible without this susceptibility. Unless there is a
prompt and almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends
and interests of others, the intellectual side of judgment