fessions_, IX. iv. 8
" _Confessions_, X. xxxiii. 50
" _On Psalm_ cxviii., _Sermon_ xxix. 1
XIII. Must Prayer necessarily be Attentive?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Varieties of Attention at Prayer
S. Augustine, _On Psalm_ lxxxv. 7
" _On Psalm_ cxlv. 1
S. Thomas, _On Distractions, Com. on 1 Cor._ xiv. 14
XIV. Should our Prayers be Long?
XV. Is Prayer Meritorious?
S. Augustine, _On Psalm_ xxvi.
" _Ep._ cxxx. _ad Probam._
XVI. Do Sinners gain Anything from God by their Prayers?
XVII. Can We rightly term "Supplications," "Prayers,"
"Intercessions," and "Thanksgivings," parts of Prayer?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Prayer of the Consecration
S. Augustine, _Of Divers Questions_, iv.

I

Is Prayer an Act of the Appetitive Powers?

S. Isidore says[98]: "To pray is the same thing as to speak." Speaking,
however, belongs to the intellect. Hence prayer is not an act of the
appetitive, but of the intellectual faculties.

According to Cassiodorus, on those words of the Psalmist: _Hear my
prayer, O Lord, and my supplication, give ear to my tears_,[99] prayer
means "the lips' reasoning." Now there is this difference between the
speculative and the practical reason, that the speculative reason merely
apprehends things, while the practical reason not only apprehends
things, but actually causes them. But one thing is the cause of another
in two ways: in one way, perfectly--namely, as inducing a necessity--as
happens when the effect comes entirely under the power of a cause; in
another way, imperfectly--namely, by merely disposing to it--as happens
when an effect is not entirely under the power of a cause.

And so, too, reason is in two ways the cause of certain things: in one
way as imposing a necessity; and in this way it belongs to the reason to
command not merely the lower faculties and the bodily members, but even
men who are subject to us, and this is done by giving commands. In
another way as inducing, and in some sort disposing to, an effect; and
in this way the reason asks for something to be done by those who are
subject to it, whether they be equals or superiors.

But both of these--namely, to command something, or to ask or beg for
something to be done--imply a certain arrangement--as when a man
arranges for something to be done by somebody else. And in this respect
both of these acts come under the reason w