t I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes
says, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical
aid of convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if
we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly
appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language; as the
opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of
names, and what is the use of them?

CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform:
the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which
are expressed by them.

SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is,
so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the
other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same
art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will
also know things.

CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.

SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information
about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the
best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of
information about them; there can be no other.

SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who
discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the
method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and
discovery.

CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery
are of the same nature as instruction.

SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names
in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great
danger of being deceived?

CRATYLUS: How so?

SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his
conception of the things which they signified--did he not?

CRATYLUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names
according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his
followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?

CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely
have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at
all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and
the proof is--that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in
speaking that all the