ch
occurs must have been due to definite causes, these things, in relation
to the selective process of the washer, are what is called accidental:
that is to say, they have nothing to do with the causative action of the
selective process. Now, in precisely the same sense Darwin calls the
multitudinous variations of plants and animals accidental. By so calling
them he expressly says he does not suppose them to be accidental in the
sense of not all being due to definite causes. But they are accidental
in relation to the sifting process of natural selection: all that they
have to do is to furnish the promiscuous material on which this sifting
process acts.

Or let us take an even closer analogy. The power of selective breeding
by man is so wonderful, that in the course of successive generations all
kinds of peculiarities as to size, shape, colour, special appendages or
abortions, &c., can be produced at pleasure, as we saw in the last
chapter. Now all the promiscuous variations which are supplied to the
breeder, and out of which, by selecting only those that are suited to
his purpose, he is able to produce the required result--all those
promiscuous variations, in relation to that purpose, are accidental.
Therefore the selective agency of the breeder deserves to be regarded as
the cause of that which it produces, or of that which could not have
been produced but for the operation of such agency. But where is the
difference between artificial and natural selection in this respect?
And, if there is no difference, is not natural selection as much
entitled to be regarded as a true cause of the origin of natural
species, as artificial selection is to be regarded as a true cause of
our domesticated races? Here, as in the case of the previous
illustration, if there be any ambiguity in speaking of variations as
accidental, it arises from the incorrect or undefined manner in which
the term "accidental" is used by Darwin's critics. In its original and
philosophically-correct usage, the term "accident" signifies a property
or quality not essential to our conception of a substance: hence, it has
come to mean anything that happens as a result of unforeseen causes--or,
lastly, that which is causeless. But, as we know that nothing can happen
without causes of some kind, the term "accident" is divested of real
meaning when it is used in the last of these senses. Yet this is the
sense that is sought to be placed upon it by the objection whic