much as possible with the
spirit only, without either looking round when he is thinking, or
letting any other sense interrupt his reflecting; but who, making use
of pure thought only, strives to grasp everything as it is in itself,
separating it as much as possible from eyes and ears, in short from
the whole body, which only disturbs the soul and does not allow it to
attain truth and insight when associated with the soul.... Now is not
death the release and separation of the soul from the body? And it is
only true philosophers who are always striving to release the soul as
far as they can. This, therefore, is the philosopher's vocation, to
deliver and separate the soul from the body.... Therefore it would be
foolish if a man, who all his life has taken measures to be as near
death as possible, should, when it comes, rebel against it.... In
truth the real seekers after wisdom aspire to die, and of all men they
are those who least fear death." Moreover Socrates bases all higher
morality on liberation from the body. He who only follows what his
body ordains is not moral. Who is valiant? asks Socrates. He is
valiant who does not obey his body but the demands of his spirit when
these demands imperil the body. And who is temperate? Is not this he
who "does not let himself be carried away by desires, but who
maintains an indifferent and moral demeanour with regard to them.
Therefore are not those alone temperate who set least value on the
body and live in the love of wisdom?" And so it is, in the opinion of
Socrates, with all virtues.

Thence Socrates goes on to characterise intellectual cognition. What
is it after all, to cognise? Undoubtedly we arrive at it by forming
judgments. I form a judgment about some object; for instance, I say to
myself, what is in front of me is a tree. How do I arrive at saying
that? I can only do it if I already know what a tree is. I must
remember my conception of a tree. A tree is a physical object. If I
remember a tree, I therefore remember a physical object. I say of
something that it is a tree, if it resembles other things which I have
previously observed and which I know to be trees. Memory is the medium
for this knowledge. It makes it possible for me to compare the various
objects of sense. But this does not exhaust my knowledge. If I see two
similar things, I form a judgment and say, these things are alike.
Now, in reality, two things are never exactly alike. I can only find a
likeness in