by sensibility. While the Fathers do not make
any explicit and scientific distinction between Epistemology and
Ontology, such as has in modern times been the bane of any attempted
natural theology, yet they seem to have made a pretty constant
_practical_ separation between the two. St. Clement of Alexandria, as we
have seen, holds that by a method of abstraction of specific
characteristics we can arrive only at an "Unknown," to which meaning can
be given only by combining with this rational process some content
furnished directly by the senses or, indirectly, by testimony, and he
further states that God is not a subject for demonstration--_i.e._, the
science that depends on primary and better known principles--for "first
principles are incapable of demonstration."[94] This position seems to
be tacitly assumed by the patristic writers throughout, and even where
they speak of Plato with gratitude and admiration they never seem to be
at all inclined to make any use of his "Idealogical" argument or
anything related thereto. They seem to take a common-sense stand for the
testimony of the whole man, as well as for the whole truth, and to
instinctively distrust any rational concept in the formation of which
sensuous content had been ignored.

The Eclectic character of the patristic thought is seen also in the
frequency with which they use the different forms of the theistic
argument in conjunction, or present it in mixed forms. The Greek
philosophers, as we have seen, each selected some one of the forms of
the argument, and by means of it, attempted to establish the sort of an
{Arche}, to which such a course of reasoning would lead, ignoring, or
attacking the forms in use by their rival school. Thus early, however,
as in modern times, Christian theology, in contrast with the attempts of
rational theology, began to emphasize the interdependence of these
different forms of the theistic argument, and the cumulative character
of their evidence. Each one of itself could bring no conviction, nor
even high degree of probability, and furthermore, even if all its claims
be admitted, would lead to a result far short of theism--a mere
indefinite first cause, an Architect of the universe, etc. Each one,
however, adds its quota to a great _cumulative_ argument, which, taken
in its entirety, raises an exceedingly high presumption, which amounts
to "_moral_" though possibly not intellectual proof. And, after all,
"probability is the guide o