rope, certainly far less than either England or America, was able to
realize the possibilities of trouble. As a matter of fact, not for years
had the peace of Europe been so assured, apparently. President Poincare
of France had gone to visit the Czar of Russia, and the two rulers had
exchanged compliments. The alliance of France and Russia, they told one
another, made war impossible, or nearly so. The Emperor of Germany was
on a yachting cruise; even the old Austrian Kaiser, though required to
watch affairs because of the death of his heir, the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, murdered by a Serb fanatic at Sarajeve, had left Vienna.

Even when the storm cloud began to gather the French government did all
it could to suppress the news. The readiness of France was not in
question. France was always ready, as Henri Martin had said. Since the
grim and terrible lesson of 1870 she had made up her mind never again to
give the traditional enemy beyond the Rhine--and, alas, now on this side
of the Rhine as well!--a chance to catch her unprepared.

What the government wanted was to prevent the possibility that an
excited populace, especially in Paris, might force its hand. If war came
it meant that Germany should provoke it--if possible, begin it. It was
willing to sacrifice some things for that. And this was because, in the
years of peace, France had won a great diplomatic victory, the fruits of
which the country must preserve. In 1870 France had had to face Germany
alone. She had counted upon help from Austria, now Germany's firm friend
and ally, but then still smarting under the blow of the defeat four
years before. She had hoped for help, perhaps, from Roumania and from
Russia.

But all that Germany, by skillful trickery, had rendered vain. She had
made France seem to be the aggressor, and France had forfeited the
sympathy of England and of Austria as a result. Alone she had been no
match for Germany. And alone she would be as little a match for Germany
in 1914 as in 1870. But she had prepared herself. Now Russia, no matter
what the reason for war, would be with her. And, if France was attacked,
England was almost sure to join her. Everything would depend on that.
With the great English navy to bottle up the German fleet, to blockade
the German coasts, France felt that she was secure. And so the
government was resolved that nothing should happen to make possible the
loss of England's friendship; nothing that should give England eve