river was opened, and they could throw an army in the rear
of the Confederates as far south as Florence, in Alabama, within a
few days. Indeed the Confederate officers expected this, and
wondered that the Federals failed to do it immediately, as this
movement would have cut off Johnson's retreat, and have forced him
to surrender, fight, or escape eastward through Knoxville, giving up
the whole West to the loyal forces. The delay of the United States
forces to take Fort Donelson allowed General A. Sidney Johnson to
reach Corinth by March. Here General Beauregard, in command of the
army of the Mississippi valley, and already there in person,
determined to make a stand.

Great difference of opinion existed among Southern officers as to
the expediency of this retreat. Many, among whom were Generals
Breckenridge, Hindman, and Bowen, counseled to assume the offensive,
and make a bold dash upon Louisville, Ky. This became the general
opinion subsequently; and had it been adopted as the policy in the
beginning, would have given a different phase to the war in the
West, at least for a time.

A ludicrous scene occurred at this time, illustrating the liability
to panic to which even brave men are sometimes subject. While
resting at Murfreesboro, of course we were liable to be overtaken by
Buell's cavalry, and as Colonel Morgan was not a man to be caught
asleep, he kept scouting parties ever on the alert, scouring the
country on different roads for miles in the direction of the Federal
army. I was in command of a squad of eight men, with whom I made a
long and rapid march in the direction of Lebanon, and when returning
by a different route, night overtook us some fifteen miles from
camp. After getting supper at a farm-house, we were again in the
saddle at ten o'clock of a calm, quiet evening, with a dim moon to
light us back to camp. We jogged on unsuspicious of danger, as we
were now on the return from the direction of the Federal cavalry.
Within ten miles of camp, near midnight, we passed through a lane
and were just entering a forest, when we became aware that a cavalry
force was approaching on the same road; but who they were, or how
many, we had no idea. We were not expecting another party of our men
in this direction, and yet they could hardly be Federals, or we
would have heard of them, as we had been near their lines, and among
the friends of the Southern cause.

Acting on the principle that it is safer to ask than to a