e Roman princes.

It is not without the most sincere regret, that I must now take leave of
an accurate and faithful guide, who has composed the history of his
own times, without indulging the prejudices and passions, which usually
affect the mind of a contemporary. Ammianus Marcellinus, who terminates
his useful work with the defeat and death of Valens, recommends the
more glorious subject of the ensuing reign to the youthful vigor and
eloquence of the rising generation. The rising generation was not
disposed to accept his advice or to imitate his example; and, in the
study of the reign of Theodosius, we are reduced to illustrate the
partial narrative of Zosimus, by the obscure hints of fragments and
chronicles, by the figurative style of poetry or panegyric, and by the
precarious assistance of the ecclesiastical writers, who, in the heat of
religious faction, are apt to despise the profane virtues of sincerity
and moderation. Conscious of these disadvantages, which will continue
to involve a considerable portion of the decline and fall of the Roman
empire, I shall proceed with doubtful and timorous steps. Yet I may
boldly pronounce, that the battle of Hadrianople was never revenged by
any signal or decisive victory of Theodosius over the Barbarians: and
the expressive silence of his venal orators may be confirmed by the
observation of the condition and circumstances of the times. The fabric
of a mighty state, which has been reared by the labors of successive
ages, could not be overturned by the misfortune of a single day, if the
fatal power of the imagination did not exaggerate the real measure of
the calamity. The loss of forty thousand Romans, who fell in the plains
of Hadrianople, might have been soon recruited in the populous provinces
of the East, which contained so many millions of inhabitants. The
courage of a soldier is found to be the cheapest, and most common,
quality of human nature; and sufficient skill to encounter an
undisciplined foe might have been speedily taught by the care of the
surviving centurions. If the Barbarians were mounted on the horses, and
equipped with the armor, of their vanquished enemies, the numerous studs
of Cappadocia and Spain would have supplied new squadrons of cavalry;
the thirty-four arsenals of the empire were plentifully stored with
magazines of offensive and defensive arms: and the wealth of Asia might
still have yielded an ample fund for the expenses of the war. But the
eff