ect character, and failed to throw a clear light upon all the
circumstances of the case, including the motive for the crime, he had
advised her Majesty to commute the sentence to one of imprisonment for
life.

The very day that this unsatisfactory announcement appeared, thirteen
judges sat side by side at the Royal Law Courts to consider the point
reserved.

Charles Prescott represented the prisoner. If the judges felt any
surprise at this change of sides they were careful not to express it.
Young Mr. Pollard appeared on behalf of the Crown, but he was led by
the great Appleby, Q.C., and, as a matter of fact, was not allowed to
open his lips once during the proceedings.

Prescott's argument was long and elaborate. A crowded bar were present
to hear the celebrated case, and the feeling was universal among them
that he had never shone so conspicuously on any former occasion. He
took up the history of the law of murder from its earliest stages, and
along with it he traced the gradual evolution of circumstantial
evidence. He showed with what suspicion and reluctance the latter had
been gradually admitted into our courts, and how succeeding judges had
been careful to fence it in and restrain its application. Then he
turned to the particular rule of law which Tressamer had relied on in
the Assize Court, and repeated and emphasized the arguments made use
of by him. He wound up with an impressive appeal to the judges to lean
in the prisoner's favour, reminding them of the old maxim that a
statute must be construed in favour of life, and asking them to apply
the same principle in expounding the common law.

Then Appleby, Q.C., addressed the court. In reply to Prescott's last
observations, he said that imperfection of evidence was a good ground
for commutation of sentence, but none for releasing the prisoner
altogether. This was, of course, a reminder to the judges of the Home
Secretary's decision, announced that morning. Then he proceeded to
argue the case on general lines.

He began by stigmatizing Hale's precept as a mere piece of advice to
juries, rather than a maxim of law. He went on to say:

'The most serious difficulty in following this rule is to know how
far to apply it. How much of the deceased's body is it necessary to
produce in order to justify a conviction? If the head had been
discovered, surely my learned friend would not venture to argue that
that was not sufficient. It seems clear that it must be a quest