nemy
there, and rejoin the company as soon as you can. Corporal Jones, be
on the lookout for any signals that Corporal Smith may make."

Corporal Smith then gives the command, "=1. Forward, 2. March=," and
such other commands as may be necessary.

=Instructor:= Now, when you reach this point (indicating point), what
do you see?

(Corporal Smith holds his rifle horizontally above his head.)

=Corporal Jones:= Captain, Corporal Smith signals that he sees a small
body of the enemy.

=Corporal Smith:= =Lie down. Range, 700. 1. Ready; 2. AIM; 3. Squad;
4. FIRE. 1. Forward; Double time; 2. MARCH=, etc.

The noncommissioned officers and the privates who are thus designated
to do certain things must use their imagination as much as possible.
They must look at the map and imagine that they are right on the
ground, in the hostile territory; they must imagine that they see the
streams, hills, woods, roads, etc., represented on the map, and they
must not do anything that they could not do if in the hostile
territory, with the assumed conditions actually existing.

=955.= The general idea of this system of instruction is to make the
noncommissioned officers and the privates think, to make them use
common sense and initiative in handling men in various situations, in
getting out of difficulties. By thus putting men on their mettle in
the presence of their comrades and making them bring into play their
common sense and their powers of resourcefulness, it is comparatively
easy to hold the attention of a whole squad, section, platoon or
company, for those who are not actually taking part in the solution of
a particular problem are curious to see how those who are taking part
will answer different questions and do different things--how they will
"pan out."

=956.= Everything that is said, everything that is done, should, as
far as practicable, be said and done just as it would be said and done
in the field. The commands should be actually given, the messages
actually delivered, the reports actually made, the orders and
instructions actually given, the signals actually made, etc., just the
same as they would be if the operations were real. Of course,
sometimes it is not practicable to do this, and again at other times
it would be advisable not to do so. If, for instance, in the solution
of a problem there were a great many opportunities to give commands to
fire, to make signals, to deliver messages, etc., and if these things
we