war, Grant had become noted, rather
through hard-hitting than strategic combination. His zenith was mounted
on the capture of Vicksburg; a project which northern generals
denounced as bad soldiership and possible of success, only through an
enemy's weakness. At this time, he was certainly not in high estimation
of his own army, because of dogged disregard of loss in useless
assaults; and it will be recalled that General McClernand was
court-martialed for his declaration that he "could not be expected to
furnish brains for the whole army!" The estimate of Grant's compeers is
not refuted by any evidence in the War Department that, from Shiloh to
Appomattox, he ever made one combination stamped by mark of any
soldiership, higher than courage and bull-dog tenacity. Even scouting
the generally-accepted idea, in the army of Vicksburg and later in that
of Chattanooga--that McPherson provided plans and details of his
campaigns; and dismissing McClernand's costly taunt as mere
epigram--this was the accepted estimate of General Grant's tactical
power.

But he inaugurated his command at Chattanooga with boldness and vigor.
He concentrated 25,000 troops in the town; opened his communications;
and then--to prevent any possible movement flanking him out of
them--boldly took the initiative.

Meantime, Longstreet had been detached by General Bragg, for that
badly-provided, badly-digested and wholly ill-starred expedition to
Knoxville; one which seemed to prove that the history of misfortune was
ever to repeat itself, in impracticable diversions at precisely the
wrong time. For, even had this corps not been badly equipped and
rationed, while almost wholly lacking in transportation, it certainly
depleted a daily-weakening army, in the face of one already double its
numbers and daily increasing.

On November 18th--spite of management that forced him to subsist on
precarious captures--Longstreet reached the enemy's advanced lines, at
Knoxville; drove him into the city and completely isolated him from
communication. Capitulation was a mere matter of time; but disastrous
news from the main army drove the Confederate to the alternative of
assault, or retreat. Choosing the former, he made it with the same
desperate gallantry displayed at Gettysburg, or Corinth; illustrated by
brilliant, but unavailing, personal prowess. The strength of the
enemy's works--and openness of approach, with wire netting interlaced
among the stumps of the new cle