al accounts are presented in a form which makes such discussion
very difficult. The establishment of an Estimates Committee is an
advance. But even an Estimates Committee cannot do such work without the
aid of a whole series of special bodies intimately acquainted with the
working of various departments. In short, the House of Commons has
largely lost control over national expenditure. As for the control of
administration, we have already seen how inadequate that is, and why it
is inadequate.

These deficiencies must be corrected if Parliament is to regain its
prestige, and if our system of government is to attain real efficiency.
For this purpose two things are necessary: in the first place,
substantial changes in the procedure of Parliament; in the second place,
the delegation to subordinate bodies of such powers as can be
appropriately exercised by them without impairing the supreme authority
of Parliament as the mouthpiece of the nation. I cannot here attempt to
discuss these highly important matters in any detail. In regard to
procedure, I can only suggest that the most valuable reform would be the
institution of a series of committees each concerned with a different
department of Government. The function of these committees would be to
investigate and criticise the organisation and normal working of the
departments, not to deal with questions of broad policy; for these ought
to be dealt with in relation to national policy as a whole, and they
must, therefore, be the concern of the minister and of the Cabinet,
subject to the overriding authority of Parliament as a whole. In order
to secure that this distinction is maintained, and in order to avoid the
defects of the French committee system under which independent
_rapporteurs_ disregard and override the authority of the ministers, and
thus gravely undermine their responsibility, it would be necessary not
only that each committee should include a majority of supporters of
Government, but that the chair should be occupied by the minister or his
deputy.

DEVOLUTION

Nor can I stop to dwell upon the very important subject of the
delegation or devolution of powers by Parliament to subordinate bodies.
I will only say that devolution may be, and I think ought to be, of two
kinds, which we may define as regional and functional. To regional
bodies for large areas (which might either be directly elected or
constituted by indirect election from the local government autho